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I

to sit, conscious that anyone was
USED to be embarrassed when I had
looking at me, and listen to specimens of introductory oratory such as
we have just heard, and as I have heard
sometimes before when I have been introduced, until some years ago when I
tried to sit on the bench in a city to
the east of us and did not decide a case
to the satisfaction of the populist
newspapers and they compared me to
Pontius Pilate. There isn't anything
that anybody has ever been able to say
about me since that time that has
given me the slightest concern!

When the American Bar Association
met in London three years ago we were
told over and over again that we were
there in virtue of the common blood,
and the common institutions and the
common speech. Yet some of us began
to reflect and as we looked somewhat
at the real members of the American
Bar Association there present we could
not but be conscious that that common blood had been considerably diluted on this side of the water; and
when we came to look into the common institutions we could not but
notice that beginning about 1700, be-
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ginning after the revolution of 1688,
the common institutions had diverged
very considerably. And as to the common speech, well we understood our
English Brethren, and they understood
us in a measure, but when we found
that nearly every one of them carried
in his pocket a dictionary of Americanisms, and when some of us were
privileged to look at that dictionary,
and found among other things that it
defined a "jag" as an umbrella, we began to suspect that even the common
speech had diverged considerably since
our separation from the mother country!
And so if you will look at the proceedings of that meeting you will
notice that in the later days of the
meeting the speeches all dwelt upon
the common law as about the only
thing that we could find really that we
had in common. That led me, after I
came back, to think about this co-ainon law.
There does seem to be such a thing.
If you go into any reasonably complete law library there are of course
volumes of black letter, which no one
can read any longer; there are rows
of text books in crumbling law sheep
binding, covered with dust; there are
old reports accumulating dust, all of
which in their time formed a part of
the law as it stood at some given date
in some given place.
And yet out of all that welter of legal precepts and statutes obsolete and
obsolescent-out of all that welter
there does seem to arise something
that gives unity to English speaking
peoples; that makes us conscious of
living under one law with England and
Canada and Australia; and that makes
us conscious of a certain continuity,
not merely with Blackstone's time, not
merely with the classical law, shall we
say? of the seventeenth century, of the
time of Lord Coke or even the great
worthies of the middle ages, Choate
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and Bryan and Fortescue. And if we
call that common element which gives
this unity and continuity to the law
of English speaking peoples, if we
call it the common law, or if we give
it its medieval name of the law of the
land, I suppose there is oo phenomenon of our social or political history
that is so significant as the persistence
and the vitality of that law of the land.
It has come into competition at one
time or another all over the world with
its great rival the modern Roman law
system.
I suppose only historians
know that the custom of Paris was
once law in Michigan and Wisconsin
and Illinois. Look at the map. The
map bears abundant evidence that.
those states were once French territory, and yet I suppose there is not a
mark upon the law of those jurisdictions to suggest that they were ever
anything but common law jurisdictions
Take Florida. Florida was once a
domain of the Roman Spanish law, and
there are remnants of Spanish architecture there today to remind us that
that was once a part of the domain of
Spain. And yet there is not even a
word in the law of Florida to suggest
that it ever was under any other than
the English common law.
And take the domain where we are
today, carved out of the Louisiana purchase. Outside of Louisiana where is
there anything to suggest that this was
ever any other than a common law domain? The map shows that the French
voyageur and Spaniards reached here
or hereabout, but there isn't anything
in the law books to suggest it.
And even in Louisiana, where they
have the civil code, that I suppose is
almost literaly translated from the
French civil code, the whole departments of the law have become, as you
might say, Anglicized. Their whole
law of torts has become our AngloAmerican common law, and outside of
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family law and the law of inheritance
and a few things in the law of property, Louisiana itself is pretty nearly
a common law jurisdiction.
But it is not only in respect to place
and geography, that the common law
has shown that persistence and that
vitality. At one time or another in its
history, it has come into competition
with the strongest social and political
forces of the time and it always has
come out victor.
Go back to the very beginnings of
our common law, in the twelfth century. The common law came into conflict there with the Church, the most
powerful force in the middle ages, and
in the Constitutions of Clarendon there
was a compromise between the common law and the law of the church,
and a wonderful compromise it was, a
compromise that gave to the common
law everything that was significant in
the administration of justice between
Englishmen and Englishmen.
Later, at the time of the Tudors, the
movement that swept over western
Europe in the reception of Roman law
made it look for a time as if the
Roman law might prevail even in
England. But it did not. England
alone of the countries of Western
Europe resisted that movement and retained the law of the land. And later,
with the Stuarts, the common law
again came in conflict with the strongest force of the time, the doctrine of
passive obedience and absolute power,
or the desire for absolute power, on
the part of the Stuart kings. Again
the common law marched triumphant
and imposed upon those kings the
dogma that the king ruled under God
and the law.
Come to our own legal history. After
the Revolution the common law again
came into conflict with the strongest
force of the time, the rising tide of
Jeffersonian democracy. The common
law had to contend with the odium of
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English origin. Things English were
looked on with disfavor; things French
were in favor at that time. The common law was under suspicion because
of its doctrine as to the obligation of
contracts, that were not popular with
the great population of debtors after
the Revolution; and this doctrine of
the supremacy of the law and judicial
power was not looked upon with favor
by those who conceived of the legislature as most immediately responsive
to the popular will.
Yet the common law prevailed.
Its
supremacy
remained
unquestioned
through the nineteenth century.
And now, within
of us, again with
legislation, at the
present century, the

the memory of all
the rise of social
beginning of the
common law came

in conflict with the strongest force of
the time.
Almost forgotten, I suppose, are the days of agitation for recall of judges and recall of judicial
decisions, that threatened the doctrine
of supremacy of the law and the fundamental notion of an independent judiciary. Yet there again the common
law definitely triumphed and imposed
even upon sovereign peoples its doctrine that they too rule under God and
the law.
We seem therefore to have something very real, very tangible, here,
that gives unity and consistency to the
law and to the legal institutions of
English-speaking peoples, that gives
continuity virtually from the middle
ages to the present.
And yet, when we try to put our finger on something definite, and say,
"this
is that common law," I venture
to think we shall find it very elusive.
What is it that gives to the institutions of English-speaking peoples this
unity, consistency, continuity? What
is it that makes the English lawyer,
the Canadian lawyer, the Australian
lawyer, the American lawyer, conscious
of living under the same system?

THE DENVER

BAR ASSOCIATION

Well, certainly it is not that we have
got a body of legal precepts in common. We have only to look at the
statute books in the different Englishspeaking jurisdictions, or even the
statute books in our 48 different states,
to see that that is not true. And if
you turn to our reported judicial decisions, you quickly find that diversities in geography and social and political conditions have given rise to a
wealth of diversity in legal precepts.
Take one example that I would like
to adduce on this point. In Oklahoma
the personal property of a deceased
passes to his heirs. In England the
real property of a deceased person
passes to his personal representative.
And yet England and Oklahoma are
both common law jurisdictions.
There is not, then, any continuity
to legal precepts, nor any consistency
or unity of legal precepts.
I had occasion some years ago to
look into the reports for 150 years,
from 1774, the declaration of rights of
the Continental congress, to 1924. And
I found that you could not put your
finger on a single decision in the reports of 1774 and say, There is a proposition that obtains as a bit of living
law actually governing the everyday
administration of justice in the United
States today.
What do you find in those reports?
Why, they are filled with the minutiae
of procedure for imprisonment for
debt, the minutiae of procedure for
the settlement of paupers, the minutiae
of proceedings in real actions-and
how many of you here know what a
real action is?-and the many details
of the old eighteenth century common
law procedure. There is just one decision in the reports of that year on a
point of bills and notes, and it is not
in any way significant, it has reference
to a custom that is as dead as the dodo.
It is not then in any common body
of precepts that we are to find this
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common law. Well, I can imagine
your saying, We knew that long ago;
it is not that they are common precepts, but there are certain common
principles, certain principles that obtain wherever English law has followed English speech, and they set off our
common law from the Roman law of
the whole world. Well, one should like
to think so; but it is pretty hard to
find them. You can put your finger on
certain principles, but the moment you
do that you are likely to find that they
are common not merely to the Englishspeaking world but to the whole world.
There are a certain number of principles of universal justice that obtain
wherever
justice
is
administered
among civilized men, and we haven't
any patent on them in common law
jurisdictions.
When you get beyond those principles you will find it very hard to put
your finger upon anything. I had occasion not long ago to turn to the
great book of the law in the days of
Henry VIII, where there are several
pages of what are called customs, fundamental common law propositions,
and there is not a single one of them
thaf we recognize today. Turn to that
oracle of our common law, Sir Edward
Coke, in the reign of James I. Look at
what he calls principles, the authority
or premise for judicial reason, and
they are so scholastic, so pedantic, so
out of touch with what we regard as
realities that they simply make you
smile. There is not a proposition there
that you can say with assurance is a
distinctive,
characteristic,
common
law principle.
Well, one might say, those are not
significant
things,
the
significant
things are institutions, and there are
certain
institutions t h a t prevail
wherever the English law has been in
force, and there are three institutions
that occur to each of you instantly
when we speak of common law institutions, the doctrine of precedents, the
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doctrine of the supremacy of the law
and trial by jury.
.Now I should like to think that there
we have three characteristics, universal, fundamental and eternal, of common law institutions, and if you could
let it go at that I think we would all
be well satisfied; but the moment you
begin to look into it you get an uneasy feeling even there.
Take the doctrine of precedents;
that has been relaxing considerably
in our practice in this country for 150
The theory is that a single
years.
decision has the authority of law. But
has it? Look at the long list of overruled cases in any of our states, and
ask yourself if single decisions actually have the authority of law with us.
The fact of it is we have been relaxing our doctrine and they have been
expanding theirs until we are very
much alike all over the modern world.
Well, you say, there is the supremacy
of the law. The late Professor Dyer of
Oxford wrote a book in which he did
seem to demonstrate that there is a
fundamental, universal, peculiar common law institution, and of course we
carry it to its legal extreme in our
doctrine of judicial power over unconstitutional legislation. But I was
considerably astonished not so long
ago to find that a Roman (Dutch)
court in South Africa had reached the
identical conclusion on the basis of
Justinian's Digest and Commentaries
of Modern Roman law. A court in
Roumania not so long ago reached the
identical conclusion on the basis of
Roman law authority.
But as I say, we have carried it to
the extreme in our doctrine of judicial
power over unconstitutional legislation, which is not admitted in England.
Roman law authorities and Roman
law technique sometimes afford a like
conclusion to men who do not know
how to use and do not have access to
our American authorities.
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Well, you say, there is trial by jury;
we have always recognized in that a
peculiar, characteristic, fundamental
common law institution. Yes, but the
civil jury is almost extinct in England,
and one cannot study American legislation without being conscious that the
civil jury shows signs of being moribund in this country.
amendLegislative constitutional
ments are continually encroaching upon the common law institution of trial
by jury, and I can conceive that much
may happen to it in the next generation. In the generation to come we
shall not be so sure that there is a
fundamental, eternal, peculiar common law institution.
Take the one matter of cases that
call for expert opinio'a evidence. There
is pretty strong pressure from our
brethren in the medical profession to
introduce quite a different element into
cases involving expert testimony, and
I can see that there may be a considerable infusion of the inquisitorial as
distinguished from the controversial
in our trial procedure.
But let us suppose that we have a
certain residuum of precepts, of forms
and of institutions which are fundamental, characteristic common law institutions, we must notice that that
residuum seems to be under attack today from more than one point.
First, of course, you will think of
legislation. Well, legislation in a way
is not so alarming in that connection.
Legislation is administered by judges
trained in the common law; it is interpreted by common law canons of interpretation; it is developed with a
common law background, and it deals
with particularly isolated situations.
You see it does not, after all, involve
great danger to the unity or consistency of the common law. And then
anyhow legislation is apt to be a little
like the hurry of the Frenchman's
time when he said he made himself
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years.

I like to think of a statute that may
be found in the old statute books of
Indiana. There was an old time surveyor in Indiana who was usually
called as an expert in land cases, and
he did not like to carry out long columns of figures, so he always figured
pi as 3.14, which was good enough for
most cases. But in came some rather
smart young man who had been trained in more modern methods, and he
used longer decimals, and began to
figure pi as 3.14159, and the old man
got into difficulties with his expert
evidence. And he was very indignant
about it, and he got himself elected to
the legislature, and he got enacted a
statute which was upon the statute
book for some years fixing, authoritatively and officially and iegally for the
state of Indiana the value of pi at 3.14!
Well, you see the unity and continuity of law is not in great danger from
that sort of thing; and that is true
enough. But when you come to examine modern legislation more critically
its destructive and corrosive possibilities prove to be very considerable.
I spoke of one point. I spoke of
legislation in Great Britain, whereby
the realty of a deceased person passes
not to his heir but to his personal representative. And they have gone further. In Great Britain today all assets in land are either fee simple absolute or terms for years. I think you
will feel that it is "going some" when
you come to reflect on what that involves. Ninety-nine years from now,
when these estates have been resolved
by their terms parliament is going to
have to get very busy unless the courts
in the meantime do something that
the legislative draftsmen did not provide for.
Take the crimes which are enacted
in every session of the legislature
without requiring a guilty mind. run-
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ning counter to every fundamental
proposition of the common law that
crimes involve a guilty mind. Take
the statutory negotiability, going cotinter to the common law proposition
that a ma. can only convey what he
has got. Take the statutory liens, of
which we have a wealth nowadays,
that have upset almost overnight what
a common law lien was. On every
hand you can see what we have taken
to be fundamental common law dogmas
undermined by legislation.
Take another institution that is
growing up with great corrosive and
destructive possibilities, namely, administration. Now I would not decry
administration for a moment. It is
required by the circumstances of our
life in an urban industrial society of
today. We have got to have a certain
individualization and the application
of rules.
It was all right in the days of the
lumber wagon to say to the farmer,
You navigate your wagon with due
care; if you don't you will have to
But
answer for the consequences.
when it comes to the day of motor
vehicles upon our highways today, you
cannot leave the matter to the ex post
facto judgment of a jury after the
event. You have got to tell the people
by white lines and yellow lines and
mechanical agencies, and even by the
agency of policemen wigwagging at
the corners, where to go and where not
to go, and when to go and when not
to go.
It is the same way in the conduct of
enterprises. We cannot lay down abstract rules for the abstract conduct
of abstract enterprises. We have got
to tell the great enterprises what they
can do and what they cannot do at
this juncture and that. So that whether we will or not we have got to expect this administrative element in
our polity.
I was talking to a physician about
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this the other day, and he said, Yes,
we are having the same experiences in
medicine; when I came into the medical profession we used to treat the
heart, the lungs, the liver, the stomach; our books told us how and we
knew the way in which to treat them.
The patient came to us; we found the
difficulty to be with his heart or his
lungs or his liver or his stomach, and
we treated his heart or his lungs or his
liver or his stomach accordingly. But
now, he said, we have learned to treat
the concrete John Doe or Richard Roe
whose heart or lungs or liver or stomach are not functioning as they should.
And it is that same tendency to individualize that is going on in every
department of human activity that we
are having to reckon with in the law.
Yes, I grant that. I am not the least
alarmed about it.
But consider its
legal possibilities for a moment.
What is it that differentiates an
administrative tribunal from a common law tribunal? Why, isn't it thaf
the administrative
tribunal treats
every situation as unique, as unrelated
to any situation that ever went before
it or that shall ever come after it? It
seizes upon the unique features of the
situation. It treats the case by itself,
unrelated to any other, past, present
or future.
The common law treatment of a controversy, on the other hand, tries to refer the essential features to some type,
to some principle of action, and to
deduce a decision accordingly.
In the very home of the common
law, at Westminster, a little more than
ten years ago the House of Lords decided that in an appeal to an administrative appellate tribunal from an
administrative officer, it was not necesssary for the administrative appellate tribunal to observe what it supposed were the ordinary decencies of
judicial appellate system. The House
of Lords held that if the administra-
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tive appellate tribunal chose to decide
a case on the secret report of an inspector sent down to look over the
situation, without anyone knowing
who he was or what he was doing, and
to act on that report without the appellant having an opportunity to spe
it, to know its contents or explain it
or refute it or meet it by argumentif the appellate tribunal chose to proceed in that manner, the only qiuestion
that the House of Lords could ask was,
Did it treat everybody else in the same
way? If that was its ordinary method
of procedure; if it applied to all litigants, there could be no complaint,
even though that ordinary procedure
was the procedure of Harun-al-Rashid
by way of relieving the tedium of
royal ennui through the administration of justice.
Well, you 'see that is England; and
queer things have been happening in
the old country. We have known for
some time that some legislation has
been pretty socialistic; and I suppose
the courts have got to go that way
next.
And look at our own country the
very year that this case was decided
in the House of Lords. It happened
that a workman employed by the
Knickerbocker Ice company in New
York came home one evening in a
rather dilapidated condition. He was
nervous and shaky, white, had no appetite for his supper, and when his
wife asked him what was the matter
he said that the boys had been putting
in some ice at the basement of Hogan's
place and a 300 pound block of ice
had slipped and fallen on him and
shaken him up pretty badly. He got
n'obetter; 'his wife sent for a physician, to whom he told the same story.
The physician looked him over,' and
sent him to the hospital, where he
died at one o'clock the next morning
of delirium tremens.
As this fatality obviously grew out
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a proceeding before the workmen's
compensation commission for the statutory compensation.
The evidence
before the commission showed beyond
question that there was not a bruise
or an abrasion or a scratch or a mark
upon the body. The testimony of those
who had been at work with him was
that during the whole day he had been
neither upon the ice wagon nor the
water wagon! but that he had that day
in the interior of Hogan's place laid
the foundation of the fatal attack that
took him off the next morning. But
the statute said that the commission
in awards under the act was not to be
governed by the technical rules of evidence, and it made a highly technical
rule of evidence that there needed to
be no causal connections between the
putting of ice into that cellar and the
fatality; and having before them the
testimony of the physician and of the
widow as to what the deceased had
said, the Board -apparently actuated by
a desire-shall I say to distribute the
economic surplus?-looking by this
case by itself as a controversy between
the widow and the ice company, made
an award distributing the economic
surplus.
The Court of Appeals of New York
found itself very much embarrassed in
dealing with that case, because while
It had this evidence before it the question of fact was for the board, and so
long as it proceeded upon the question
of evidence as it was in the habit of
proceeding upon it, and dealt with this
case as it dealt with other cases, where
was there power in the court to turn
itself into an administrative body and
to apply purely legal technicalities to
things that were within the province
of this administrative board?
Well, you see there are corrosive and
destructive possibilities for the common law in these administrative commissions.

Let us look at another thing that is
going on. You would not expect to
see anything of this nature in the
treatment of controversies creeping
into judicial decisions. The art of the
common law lawyers' craft, however
technical in using legal materials, has
somehow managed to keep a very considerable uniformity and consistency
in the decisions of the courts of our
48 states. And yet there are 48 of
them, and there are nine circuit courts
of appeal, besides the Supreme Court
of the United States, each within its
sphere-shall I say with a mouth
speaking great things?-empowered to
lay down the universal, eternal common law in its particular jurisdiction.
And this tendency to individualize
seems to be creeping in at more than
one spot. Let me give you an example.
I suppose if there is anything that we
should have agreed upon a generation
ago, it was that a parent is not responSible for the child's torts. Also we
should feel that one is not responsible
for what another does unless that
other is an agent acting within the
scope of his agency.
Well, that was clear enough in the
old horse and buggy and lumber wagon
days. If little Willie took out the
family horse and buggy on a frolic of
his own, he was not likely to be able
to hurt much of anything except the
horse and buggy and himself; the public at large were in no great danger.
And so it seemed perfectly clear that
unless the parent was at fault, or unless Willie was engaged in his father's
business and within the scope of that
business, that there was no liability.
Then came the advent of motor vehicles. When little Willie takes out
the family automobile there are great
possibilities of danger, and that situation has given us pause, and in more
jurisdictions than one the judicial doctrine of the family automobile has
risen to deal with that situation.
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Now I do not say that you are to explain those decisions on the ground
that the ownership of a Ford indicates
such affluence on the part of the owner
that distribution of the economic surplus comes into account, and yet one
cannot read some decisions without suspecting that that does enter into it.
But I will be a little more charitable,
and suggest as a principle, Qui facit
per auto facit per se!
But seriously you see what I mean.
That tendency to individualize, that
tendency to treat a case as unique, to
think of it not in terms of x and y
but to think of it as the Knickerbocker
Ice company on the one side and Mary
Doe on the other, is showing itself in
every department of our legal activity.
Now I am not putting up a sign of
distress and saying that our legal
and political and social institutions
are in danger, because I do not believe
it.
If you look at legal history you will
see that there are periods of stability
and there are periods of growth. And
in periods of growth for a time we
have to grow through trial and error,
and when we are doing things through
trial and error there is very likely to
be a considerable percentage of error.
There isn't any danger to our institutions in those things, and yet isn't
there very grave danger of our losing
the continuity and the unity that has
seemed to be characteristic of the law
of English speaking peoples in the
past?
Well, what shall we say? Is there
nothing but history behind the law of
English speaking peoples? Have we
nothing in common with the English
and the Canadian and the Australian
but a certain common legal terminology? Is it true after all that there
isn't any fundamental, eternal, universal law of the land?
They tell a story of the great Bishop
Wilberforce, who when he became
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Bishop made a resolution that he
would visit every parish in his diocese. In the course of carrying out
that resolution he came presently into
one remote parish where there was
an old fox-hunting parson who mum,
bled through the service hurriedly on
Sunday morning and then got on his
horse and went about the more serious
pursuits of life; and the Bishop naturally was shocked, and he said, "This
won't do; we must have some spiritual
life in this parish." "Yes," the parson
said, "I thought so too when I came
here 40 years ago, but 40 years of life
in this parish tends to disabuse one of
ideals of that sort." But the Bishop
said, "That won't do; that won't do at
all. I will come down here next Sunday and I will preach and I will show
you what you are to do."
So the Bishop came down and
preached as only he could, one of those
characteristic magnificent sermons of
his, on the text, "The fool hath said
in his heart, there is no God." After
the service the parson said, "Now we
will see what the parish think about
it." So he sent for Hodge, a representative of the fine old English farmer, to come up and be presented to the
Bishop. And Hodge came up with his
cap in his hand, very much embarrassed, and was presented to the Lord
Bishop. "And now," the parson said,
"tell the Bishop, Hodge, what you
think of the sermon."
And Hodge
said, "My, it were a powerful sermon
-it were a powerful sermon. And do
you know, My Lord, I can't help thinking there do be a God, after all!"
Well, I cannot help thinking that
there do be a common law after all.
And I am going to suggest to you
where I think it is that we are to find
it. I think our whole difficulty in a
discussion of this sort is in assuming
that law is simply an aggregate of
laws; that if you have two thousand
rules of law, adding them together you
have law. I do not believe it. Legal
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precepts are an element in the law but
they are a relatively transient and
fleeting element. There are at least
two other elements that we have got
to take into account. One is, if I may
put it so, the art of the lawyer's craft,
the technique of the lawyer; that technique whereby he finds the grounds of
decision in authoritative legal materials; that art of his craft whereby he
develops rules for new situations out
of a body of rules made for quite different situations; that art of his craft
whereby he can eke out a constant and
reconstructive development so as to
make them into a living law for the
administration of justice in a time and
place. And then in addition to that
technique of which I speak, there is a
body of received ideals, ideals of what
the social order should be, what the
legal order should be, and consequently what the rules and principles, what
the legal precepts, ought to be. Those
received ideals are the whole background of everything that the judge
and that the lawyer does. He projects
his question upon that background and
he fills in the details according to that
picture.
Now if you look at those elements of
the law you will see that the element
of legal precept, as I said, is a relatively fleeting one. If you think of the law
of today I suppose you will think
almost instantly of contracts and torts.
Look at Blackstone's Commentaries
and see how much you will find there
of anything that we call contracts
today. It is all about contracts under
seal. The first text book upon torts
was written in 1859, and as late as
1874 a reviewer argued that there
wasn't any such thing. And if we
take contracts and torts as the significant parts of the law I need not remind you that the subject that bulks
largest in the reports today is taxation, and you cannot find that in the
reports of a generation ago.
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The life of these precepts is not
much more than a generation. What
was the first book that came out of an
American law school? It came out of
Judge Reeves famous school at Litchfield, Connecticut, and was a treatise
on the law of Baron and Fief. What
was the next book that came out of
an American school? It came out of
Harvard law school, and its title was
a Treatise on the Law of Real Actions.
There may be some lawyers here who
were brought up on Blackstone and
know what real actions are, or were,
but I suspect most of them skipped
that part and turned to the parts that
were more relevant to the affairs of
the day.
If we go back into the reports, as I
said, they are filled with settlement of
paupers, imprisonment for debt and
the minutiae of the old common law
practice, but where are the snows of
yester year? When you come to the
element of received ideals, they are
more permanent, and yet they change.
If anyone doubts that let him turn to
our classical books of the seventeenth
century where the picture is still that
of a feudal, relatively unorganized,
society. Today our ideals have been
affected by the random organization
under which we live, by the ideals of
the French revolution, by the democratic ideals of the nineteenth century,
by the identification of the immemorial
common law rights of Englishmen with
the rights of man. They are radically
different ideals, and although these
ideals change slowly, we think they are
changing, as at least suggested by the
not infrequent five to four decisions
on questions of social legislation in
the Supreme Court of the United
States.
And when we come to the element
of the art of the lawyer's craft, the
technique of the common law lawyer,
there we find something doing. We
can xecognize that technique clear back
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into the Year Books; we can recognize it in England, In Canada, in Australia, in our forty-eight states, and
there is that same model of approach
toward a legal controversy, that same
mode of handling the legal materials,
that same sure motive and AngloSaxon tendency to lay hold of concrete
experience and apply it no further
than the circumstances of a concrete
controversy require.
When you turn to the modern Roman
law you find an utterly different technique, applying written texts.
He
looks for a universal proposition and
he proceeds by a process of deduction
from a universal proposition as laid
down or not laid down in third century Rome. His books of authority
are the ancient oracle; his treatises
are commentaries upon the written
law.
But the oracle of the common law
is a judge. The books of authority are
reports of decided cases; the treatises
are commentaries upon decided cases.
And there is something that lies back
of this technic that seems to me a
most significant thing, and that is the
frame of mind of the common law
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lawyer, the frame of mind that leads
him always to keep his eye upon experience, to think of legal problems, to
think of controversies in terms of experience, to seek his solutions not in
ambitious programs for laying down
universalities, but rather in a cautious,
slow but surefooted application of experience to the exigencies of justice
for the time being.
Now in that frame of mind, in that
point of technique of the common law
lawyer, is the spirit of the common
law. I suggest to you that it is our
most precious legal and political, and
possibly social, possession; and isn't
it the duty of the common law lawyer
to see to it that in spite of the destructive and corrosive possibilities of legislation and administration, this frame
of mind, this technique, is preserved,
is handed down, to remain a living
instrument of justice among English
speaking peoples?
Reported for the Record
thru the courtesy of
C. P. Gehman
Shorthand Reporter
Denver, Colo.

Recent Statutes
By HENRY McALLIsrm, EsQ.

General Assembly in providing
HE
of the act
of the 1927
for wisdom
a "legislative
reference
office", designed to supervise the drafting of laws and the prevention of foolishly conceived and phrased statutes,
finds support in another act passed at
the same session, House Bill No. 321,
"by Representative Hill (by request)",
being "An Act to amend Sections 5162
and 5164 of the Compiled Laws of Colorado, 1921".
Section 5162 of the Compiled Laws

had been operative some twenty years,
and gave satisfactioi. It provided a
method of determining hirship to
real property in intestate estates, at
a minimum of trouble and expense, by
the filing of a petition therefor at any
time before order for final settlement
and inclusion of notice thereof in the
notice of final settlement. Section
5164 prescribed the effect of the decree upon heirs and their grantees.
The new act purports to extend the
proceedings to Inheritance of personal

